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WHEN ARE THERE MORE LAWS? WHEN DO THEY
MATTER? USING GAME THEORY TO COMPARE LAWS,
POWER DISTRIBUTION, AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENTS
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA
Ji Li†
Abstract: In several recent cases, the Supreme People’s Court of China ruled that
local police owe a positive duty to protect individual members of the general public. In
strong contrast, the United States Supreme Court declared in two police nonfeasance
cases that such duty did not exist under the Federal Constitution. This is counterintuitive,
because one would expect that in a liberal democracy where the judiciary is independent
and powerful, judges would impose higher standard on local law enforcement officers.
One possible explanation is that law does not matter in a developing country such as
China, so laws are drafted and interpreted in favor of citizens for the purpose of windowdressing. But if law does not matter at all, why are some proposed laws drafted
numerous times before passing the legislature? A conceptual game theory model is able
to resolve both the empirical puzzle and the theoretical one. In addition, this interactive
model can be applied to explain a broad range of issues in law and politics. The theory is
illustrated by the judicial politics of bankruptcy law in China, the making of bankruptcy
law in Vietnam, the Chinese law on governmental liability, the American law on police
nonfeasance, and changes in the governmental liability law in South Korea.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The goal of this paper is to explain the relationship between laws on
the books and power politics from a comparative perspective. The seed for
this research is an empirical puzzle that springs forth from a comparison of
governmental liability law on police nonfeasance between China and the
United States. The following two cases, both of which center on police
inaction, trigger the theoretical question.
In the first case, the plaintiff is a young woman who wanted to break
off her relationship with a man after learning he was already married. The
man threatened violence and the woman sought police protection several
times. Unfortunately, no assistance was provided. A thug hired by the man
threw acid on her face, deforming her and blinding her in one eye. The court
found no tort liability for the police’s failure to provide specific protection to

†
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Program of Law, Economics and Public Policy Seminar in the summer of 2005 at the Yale Law School.
The author is especially grateful to Susan Rose-Ackerman for her continuous support and belief in this
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a member of the public from harm done by another member of the public
and dismissed the case.1
In the second case, the plaintiff is a businesswoman who managed a
gift shop. There was a motel across the street. Early one morning,
disturbing noises woke two guests staying in the motel. They suspected a
burglary at the gift shop, and informed the motel manager. After a cursory
inspection, the motel manager was certain of a robbery at the gift shop. The
manager called the local police department twice and reported the ongoing
crime. No police officer was dispatched. After about twenty minutes, the
thief left with his booty. Thereafter, the store manager filed a complaint
with the police department but got no response. After the business owner
filed a lawsuit, the court found the police department liable for failure to
protect the property of a member of the public and awarded damages equal
to half of the total loss borne by the plaintiff. 2
One of these two cases was decided in a democracy with arguably the
most sophisticated judicial system in the world, and the other in an
authoritarian regime where a functional legal institution barely existed three
decades ago. For the uninitiated, a reasonable assumption is that the second
case was decided in a democratic setting with a better and more independent
judiciary. The decision in the first case seems to substantially favor the
unresponsive police department, therefore it must be from a country with
little governmental accountability and weak courts. This intuition is wrong,
however. The first case was decided in the United States,3 the second in
China.4 The former is a liberal democracy, and the latter an authoritarian
state with a weak judiciary.
In this article, I attempt to resolve this apparent contradiction. I
contend that the power distribution of potential litigants, professional norms,
and judicial independence determine how laws are applied and the costs
associated with their application, which exerts significant impact on the way
laws are drafted, legislated, and interpreted. I argue that this theory is more
powerful than extant approaches in explaining the link between power
politics and law-making.
This article proceeds as follows. Section II surveys American and
Chinese jurisprudence on official nonfeasance. Section III discusses extant
theories and shows that they are insufficient to explain some empirical
1

See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579 (N.Y. 1968).
Yin Chenyan v. the Public Security Bureau of Lushi County, SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ., Issue 2,
2003, at 36 (People’s Court of Lushi County, Dec. 12, 2002) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
3
See Riss, 22 N.Y.2d 579.
4
See Yin Chenyan, SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ., Issue 2, 2003, at 36.
2
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puzzles. Section IV provides the interactive theory, my game theory model
and examines two scenarios when different payoffs are assigned. Section V
presents empirical evidence from United States, China, Vietnam, and Korea
that supports the interactive theory. Section VI concludes the article.
II.

THE COUNTERINTUITIVE CONTRAST REFLECTS DIFFERENCES IN LAW

This section provides a survey of American and Chinese
jurisprudence on official nonfeasance, showing that the cases described
above accurately reflect the differences in law between these countries.
These differences can only be adequately considered with knowledge of
comparative police nonfeasance laws in the United States and China. To be
more specific, what are the laws on governmental liability in police
nonfeasance cases in the two countries? In the United States, the general
rule is that a municipal corporation is not liable for injuries caused by police
nonfeasance absent statutes prescribing exceptions to government
immunity.5 Some courts have upheld claims against municipal corporations
when a special relationship was established between the police and the
plaintiff.6 A state court in New York specified the four elements of such
special relationships:
(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises
or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party
who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the
municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some
form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the
injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the
municipality’s affirmative undertaking.7
Only when these four elements exist may a plaintiff prevail in a suit against
the municipal corporation for police nonfeasance. In cases related to
emergency phone calls, if the caller is not the victim, the last two conditions
are not satisfied. Therefore, it is almost certain that absent statutory
provisions, state courts in the United States will find for the municipal
corporation in a case like Yin Chenyan v. Police Department of Lushi
County.
Federal courts hold a similar view. Under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, the United States is found liable:
5

Licia A. Esposito Eaton, Liability of Municipality or Other Governmental Unit for Failure to
Provide Police Protection from Crime, 90 A.L.R. 5th 273 (2005).
6
See id.
7
See Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260 (N.Y. 1987) (citations omitted).
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for injuries resulting from a failure to provide police protection,
where the decision not to provide this protection (1) was made
by an agent of the United States performing a “discretionary”
function or duty within the scope of his employment under 28
U.S.C.A. § 2680(a), and (2) was the proximate cause of the
injuries complained of.8
Because the burden of proof of foreseeability is on the plaintiff, prevailing in
a public tort case on police inaction is a daunting task.
In general, the standard for governmental immunity has been set by
the Supreme Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services,9 where an abused child sued the county government for failure to
provide protection against his abuser.10 He claimed the Due Process Clause
of the United States Constitution imposed on the State an affirmative duty to
protect the petitioner.11 The Court held that “nothing in the language of the
Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and
property of its citizens against invasion by private actors,”12 though it
suggested that state tort laws might impose a positive duty of police
protection.13 DeShaney has been the controlling case since 1989. In 2004,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a similar case arising from the Tenth
Circuit.14 In Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, the plaintiff had a
restraining order issued by the local court against her husband. 15 Although
she presented it to the police and requested assistance enforcing it several
times in the same day, the police failed to respond.16 The plaintiff’s three
children were murdered by her husband during this time.17 In the suit
against the local government, the plaintiff’s lawyer raised a procedural due
process claim, in addition to the substantive due process claim that has been
rejected by the Court in DeShaney. However, the Supreme Court, in a 7-2
opinion, held that due process clause did not entitle respondent a property

8

Allan L. Schwartz, Liability of United States Under Federal Tort Claims Act for Injuries Resulting
from Failure to Provide Police Protection, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 903 (2001) (footnote omitted).
9
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
10
Id. at 191.
11
See id.
12
Id. at 258.
13
Id. at 201-202.
14
Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F. 3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom, Town of Castle
Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
15
545 U.S. 748, __, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2801 (2005).
16
Id. at 2801-2802.
17
Id. at 2802.
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interest in police enforcement of the restraining order against her husband,
thus maintaining its overall position on the issue.18
China, unlike the United States, is a civil law country; precedents do
not control as much as they do in a common law country. Nevertheless, the
Supreme People’s Court regularly publishes typical cases that function as
clarifications of existing statutes. Since no specific statutes exist on
governmental official nonfeasance liability, the Supreme People’s Court
created the doctrine from scratch by publishing a few cases that had broadly
interpreted extant laws. The first one concerns a villager in Sichuan
Province who sued the township police claiming that their failure to take
action against his neighbor, who suffered from a serious mental disorder and
repetitively harassed him, contributed to an injury incurred while trying to
escape from the neighbor.19 The People’s Supreme Court heard the case
because there was not a clear doctrine providing any remedy for official
nonfeasance such as police inaction. The Court opined that Public Security
Bureaus had a positive duty to protect citizens and they should be held liable
for the injury and damage due to their nonfeasance, if their action could have
prevented the injury. This decision was promulgated as an official legal
interpretation in 2001.20
Later the Court went even further by publishing Yin Chenyan v. Police
Department of Lushi County, in which the county court found the local
police department liable for property damage due to police inaction.21 As
discussed above, there was no special relationship between the plaintiff and
the police department.22 The person who made the emergency call was not
the victim and the damage was inflicted by a third party actor. Given the
facts of the case and extant statutes in China that were silent about
government liability for police nonfeasance, it is surprising the Supreme
People’s Court’s clearly signaled that local police, especially emergency call
departments, owe a positive duty to protect the general public who resort to
their assistance through emergency calls.
In sum, the comparison between the current laws in China and the
United States indicates that, counter-intuitively, the law ostensibly provides
better protection to Chinese citizens against government officials than their
counterparts in America.
18

Id. at 2810.
Kevin J. O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, Suing the Local State: Administrative Litigation in Rural China,
THE CHINA JOURNAL, Jan. 2004, at 92, 92.
20
Id.
21
Yin Chenyan v. the Public Security Bureau of Lushi County, SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ., Issue 2,
2003, at 36 (People’s Court of Lushi County, Dec. 12, 2002) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
22
Id.
19
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The development of China’s administrative law regime in which the
Supreme People’s Court published these two decisions provides background
critical to understanding the import of the decisions. The current Chinese
Constitution provides that “citizens who have suffered losses through
infringement of their civil rights by any state organ or functionary have the
right to compensation in accordance with the law.”23 Unlike in the United
States, however, the Chinese Constitution is not directly enforceable “unless
there are statutes that clearly mandate the courts to do so.”24
No concrete administrative law existed until 1987, when the “drafting
of an Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) commenced.”25 The law was
passed two years later and gave citizens a legal basis to sue government
officials.26 This legal reform is significant given that China has had more
than a thousand years of autocracy.
Administrative law legislation grew quickly in the 1990s. The
Standing Committee of the People’s Congress passed the State
Compensation Law in 1994, which was followed by the Administrative
Penalty Law, the Administrative Supervision Law, and the Administrative
Reconsideration Law in 1996, 1997, and 1999 respectively.27 In 2003, the
People’s Congress passed the Administrative Licensing Law, which was
regarded as a landmark law that facilitated the withdrawal of the state from
the market.28 All these administrative laws stipulate reasonably well the
power of the government and the remedies for the abuse of power by
government officials.
Section I presents two cases of official nonfeasance with
counterintuitive results. This section surveys American and Chinese
jurisprudence on official nonfeasance in which the two cases are embedded,
but this context alone fails to fully explain the counterintuitive outcomes,
and the puzzle remains. The highest court in the United States, a liberal
democracy, when faced with the balancing of various interests and
constitutional doctrines, decided twice against citizen victims in government
nonfeasance cases. In contrast, the highest court in China, a one-party
regime, created legal rights against official nonfeasance from scratch. What
23

Art. 41, Chapter 1, P.R.C. Constitution.
English translation is available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited January 7, 2007).
24
Xixin Wang, Suing the Sovereign Observed from the Chinese Perspective: The Idea and Practice
of State Compensation in China, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 681, 682 (2003).
25
RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 398 (2000).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Randall Peerenboom, What Have We Learned About Law and Development? Describing,
Predicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 823, 841 (2006).
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explains the dramatic differences? Before presenting my theory, I review in
Section III extant theoretical approaches to relevant empirical questions.
III.

EXTANT THEORIES ARE INSUFFICIENT TO EXPLAIN THE EMPIRICAL
PUZZLE

Many legal scholars and social scientists have spent time exploring
legal reform in China, drawing two main conclusions. Some argue that the
Chinese government acts sincerely in promoting the rule of law, while others
take a dismissive view of the current legal reform in China.29 Neither
theory adequately explains the actual outcomes of lawmaking and
application within China.
Fully aware of the benefits of ruling the country according to the law,
the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) built an administrative law regime
and allowed the People’s Supreme Court to indicate its preference for broad
interpretation of the laws. Although few predict that China will achieve the
type of rule of law embedded in a liberal democracy, some see China as
being “in transition from an instrumental rule-by-law legal system in which
law is a tool to be used as the Party-state sees fit to a rule of law system
where law does impose meaningful restraints on the Party, state and
individual members of the ruling elite.”30
Randall Peerenboom notes that plaintiffs have a much higher rate of
success in administrative litigations in China than in Japan, Taiwan, or the
United States.31 Although he admits that a conclusion cannot be drawn
without further studying the merits of cases, he argues that “clearly the
courts are not just a rubber stamp; they do have some authority.”32
Peerenboom sees an evolution of the Chinese social and political system, in
which an increasingly dynamic civil society demands a better legal
institution. In response to this demand, the CCP supplies the laws, which
the judiciary, motivated by both external and internal incentives, interprets
and applies assiduously.33 This series of movements feeds back into the
growth of the civil society, and the cultivation of a more active legal culture.

29

See Benjamin Liebman, Legal Aid, Lawyers, and Legitimacy in China, in RAISING THE BAR 318
(William P. Alford ed., forthcoming 2007); PEERENBOOM, supra note 25, at 398; HONGYING WANG, WEAK
STATE, STRONG NETWORKS, THE INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA
(2001).
30
Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law
Reform and Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China, 19 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 190 (2001).
31
Id. at 217.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 163-164.
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Besides the figures showing the increase of administrative cases and
the high winning rates for citizens, however, Peerenboom provides
insufficient evidence to convince readers that the administrative laws on the
books are being enforced to any meaningful extent. In fact, there is solid
evidence that new laws are not effective in restraining government
officials.34 For instance, in the last few years, the letter and petition system,
which is a formal but allegedly ineffective channel for individuals to protest
against the abuses of government officials, has received a growing number
of complaints.35 If administrative laws are better enforced, why would more
citizens resort to the letter and petition system for protection and dispute
resolution? Moreover, even if an authoritarian state ties its own hands for a
short time in order to add credibility to its commitment to the rule of law,
what in theory can prevent it from reneging, especially when its legitimacy
is threatened?
In contrast to the evolutionists, some scholars take a dismissive view
of the current legal reform in China. Hongying Wang argues that China is a
society built on networks where the law does not matter. Even though the
laws on the books look good, Chinese courts cannot apply them in many
situations, mainly due to their institutional weakness.36
Woo provides a list of factors that restrain judicial power:
Judges are typically drawn from the area where they reside,
and . . . the budget for each court is determined by the local
government where the court sits. Local allocation of funds for
judicial services . . . has also rendered courts dependent on the
whims of local ties and relationships.37
In addition, Alford doubts the real impact of the progress China has made in
creating formal rules and institutions.38
Many scholars even question the validity of studying the rule of law in
a non-democracy. Moustafa points out that “[t]he vast majority of political
scientists and public law scholars assume that democracy is a prerequisite

34

See O’Brien, supra note 19, at 76.
Zeng Zhiquan, She Song Xin Fang Wei He Sheng Er Bu Jiang (Why Does Litigation-Related
Letter and Petition Increase?), available at http://jdzol.com.cn/qiye/shownews.asp?NewsID=8782 (last
accessed on April 27, 2006).
36
See Wang, supra note 24.
37
Margaret Y. K. Woo, Law and Discretion in Contemporary Chinese Courts, in THE LIMITS OF THE
RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 163, 170 (Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law, Asian Law Series No. 14, 2000).
38
William Alford, The More Law, The More…? Measuring Legal Reform in the People’s Republic
of China, in HOW FAR ACROSS THE RIVER?: CHINESE POLICY REFORM AT THE MILLENNIUM 122, 130-33
(Nicholas C. Hope, Dennis Tao Yang & Mu Yang Li eds., 2003).
35
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for the judicialization of politics.”39 And because of this assumption, there
has been “an almost total neglect of the study of judicial politics in
authoritarian settings.”40
In sum, according to the dismissive view, the reason China has
ostensibly more binding administrative law than the United States is that
laws do not matter in the former; they are simply a window dressing.
Although this argument has some merits, it over-simplifies the
situation. If laws were just for show, one would expect to see today’s China
equipped with well-drafted laws of substantial sophistication in all areas.
This argument cannot explain why the government spent years revising the
drafts of certain laws, in order to get them through the legislature, e.g. the
new bankruptcy law. Moreover, the argument cannot explain why in the last
decade or so, the ruling party has started paying attention to the construction
of an administrative regime.
In short, existing theories either give an oversimplified explanation
that laws do not matter in China, or an ill-supported conclusion that the
country is moving steadily towards the rule of law. I contend in this paper
that an interdisciplinary approach focusing on power distribution will shed
more light on the interplay between changes in legal codes and domestic
politics. Although for a long time few scholars have put democracies and
non-democracies together when it comes to the study of judicial politics,
recent scholarship has moved toward interdisciplinary research and started to
explore the relationship between the commitment to laws on the books and
political structure. Garrett and others employ a game theory model to
explain the strategic decision-making process of the European Court of
Justice.41 They argue that if the Court anticipates strong resistance from
member states, it will avoid rendering an adverse decision.42 Thus, the
extant laws have been correlated with the perceived state interests and the
institutional structure of the European Union.43 Based on extensive data
analysis, Hathaway argues quite convincingly that a country’s decision to
sign a human rights treaty is determined to a great extent by the estimated
costs of and probability of compliance.44 As a result, non-democracies that
have weak internal legal enforcement systems may be more likely to sign a
39
Tamir Moustafa, Law Versus the State: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt, 28 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 883, 884 (2003).
40
Id.
41
See generally Geoffrey Garrett, R. Daniel Kelemen & Heiner Schulz, The European Court of
Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union, 52 INT’L ORG 149 (1998).
42
See id. at 174.
43
See id.
44
See Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 1838-39 (2003).
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treaty than a democracy that enjoys the rule of law, even though the latter’s
record of human rights protection is much better than the former’s.45
Although both Garrett and Hathaway focus on international judicial politics,
and the unit of analysis in their studies is the individual state, their theories
relate to the question this paper attempts to answer. That is, the way laws on
the books are drafted, legislated, and interpreted is influenced by the
probability that they will be applied and the associated costs, which is
further determined by professional norms, judicial independence and
authority, and the power distribution of potential litigants.
IV.

AN INTERACTIVE THEORY PROVIDES A BETTER EXPLANATION OF
JUDICIAL POLITICS

This section presents a game theoretic model that I believe better
explains the empirical puzzle discussed in Section I and II. I create this
simplified game structure to model the interaction among various actors in
the drafting, interpretation, legislation and enforcement of laws. Different
payoffs will be assigned when the game is applied to different legal
environments. Before delving into the more technical discussion, I briefly
describe the model in plain English.
The game illustrates my argument that legal environment and the
power distribution of potential litigants implicated by a contemplated law
determine how that law is drafted, interpreted, and legislated. For example,
suppose a drafted law or a new legal interpretation comes to the legislature,
and the legislators need to decide what to do about it. To simplify the
argument, I assume that only those who will be affected by the legal change
will react in the legislature. If the law is against one legislator’s
constituency, will he or she oppose the draft or interpretation? Since
resistance tends to be costly, the legislator’s decision depends on the costs of
noncompliance, which is further related to the level of law enforcement.
In a strong rule of law environment, e.g. the United States, laws are
expected to be enforced. So the calculation is easy. The constituency the
drafted law or interpretation disfavors will oppose it to the extent that the
cost of resistance is lower than the cost of noncompliance. But in a country
with a weak judiciary, laws are enforced in only two situations: (1) when
they extend the interests of the powerful; and (2) when the implicated
constituencies are equally powerful.
Therefore, in a weak rule of law environment, a drafted law or legal
interpretation favoring the politically weak constituency will go through the
45

Id.
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legislature because the politically powerful constituency will not oppose it,
believing that the costs of noncompliance are low due to the ultimate lack of
enforcement. That is why the highest court in China was able to create legal
rights against official nonfeasance from scratch. Whereas, a contemplated
law that implicates the interests of two equally powerful constituencies will
not be enacted without a series of compromises. This explains why the
drafted bankruptcy law in China took many years to be approved by the
Congress, leaving a saga of trading of interests. I will present more
empirical evidence for the theory in Section IV.
Graph 1. The Conceptual Game Setup.
Status Quo

P2 & P3
P1

Drafting
and
interpreting

Legislation

P2 & P3
Compliance

P4
Enforcement

There are four players in this game. Player 1 (“P1”) represents those
who draft or interpret laws. They are normally composed of distinguished
legal scholars or judges of the highest court. Player 2 (“P2”) and Player 3
(“P3”) are those whose behaviors will be governed by the drafted or
interpreted law. I assume they take adversarial positions in a suit that falls
under the jurisdiction of the law. Player 4 (“P4”) refers to those responsible
for the application of the law. They are normally composed of local
judges.46
A.

Stage 1

The way the law is drafted and interpreted is a variable. P1 is faced
with a set of choices. He could select status quo. He could also choose to
make the law more sophisticated. Once deciding to change the status quo,
he then chooses between a sophisticated law favoring P2 and a sophisticated
law favoring P3.
46

For the sake of simplification, I assume P2 and P3 are the only legislators that matter in this game.
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Stage 2

If P1 chooses to make the law more sophisticated, the game
progresses to its second stage, where the law is gauged by those whose
interests are potentially involved. P2 and P3 will fall under the jurisdiction
of the law. Therefore, at stage two, each of the two players makes a choice
between resisting the law and not resisting the law.47 The two players have
their own political power. If the resistance trumps the efforts of P1, the law
fails, and the game ends at status quo. Otherwise the law is promulgated and
set for enforcement.
C.

Stage 3

P2 and P3 are faced with the new law and the choice between
compliance and noncompliance.
D.

Stage 4

After P2 and P3 have acted, P4 makes a choice between enforcing the
law and not enforcing the law.
Payoffs for the players vary. Everything else being equal, P1 wants to
make the law more sophisticated. By doing so, P1 increases judicial
authority and prestige. But if the draft or interpretation fails, P1 incurs costs,
such as wasted time and human capital and damage to judicial power. In
short, P1 makes his choice based on the perceived probability that the draft
or interpretation will trigger resistance and the institutional power of the
resisting player.
At stage two, P2 and P3 take a close look at the draft or interpretation
and decide whether or not to resist it. There are costs associated with
resistance at this stage, for example, the cost of gathering political support to
stop the proposed legal change. Therefore, as strategic actors, P2 and P3
look ahead to later stages and estimate the subsequent costs they will incur
when the law is enforced, which should be the probability of enforcement
times the sum of the benefits and costs. If for one player the future costs are
higher than the costs of resisting at stage two, he will resist at this stage,

47

The resistance is a simplification of all the efforts used by P2 or P3 to oppose the proposed
change. It may include vetoing the draft or interpretation, amending the constitution, threatening to change
the judicial institutions, to name just a few. The concrete form of resistance depends on the political
structure of the country in discussion.

MARCH 2007

LAW, POWER DISTRIBUTION, AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

347

provided that his efforts will nullify the draft or interpretation. Otherwise,
he will allow the draft or interpretation to be put into effect.
When the law is set for application, P2 and P3 make a choice between
compliance and noncompliance. Since the change is assumed to be in favor
of one of the two players, it is often the other player that makes the actual
choice. For example, if the legislature in China passes a bankruptcy law that
gives higher priority to secured credit instead of workers’ compensation,
secured creditors who are typically state-owned banks and other financial
institutions, and workers’ unions will decide whether or not to comply with
the new law. Since the law favors the banks, it is the unions that make this
calculation. They can choose not to comply by, among other things, seizing
the assets of the debtor or blocking the resale of the collaterals. In the game,
the decisions of P2 and P3 vary according to the sum of costs and benefits of
compliance, and the expected level of enforcement. For instance, if the costs
are high and the expected enforcement level is low, they are better off not
complying.
At stage four, P4 chooses between enforcing the law and not
enforcing it. The costs of enforcement depend on a variety of factors such as
legal professionalism, litigants’ relative institutional power, and judicial
authority. Presumably, in a rule of law environment where the local courts
are more powerful and independent, there are more incentives for legal
enforcement. This is also true in a context where the litigants are of similar
institutional power and the courts play a more neutral role.
Depending on the payoffs present, backward induction reveals several
possible outcomes of the game. At the enforcement stage, P4’s decision is
based on the general institutional environment and the relative power
distribution between P2 and P3.
Table 1. The Enforcement Decision by Player 4.
Vertical Power Relationship
Between Litigants48

Horizontal Power
Relationship Between
Litigants49

Strong Rule of Law

Enforce

Enforce

Weak Rule of Law

Not Enforce If Law Favors
The Less Powerful

Enforce

48

In this paper, vertical power distribution describes the situation where one of P2 and P3 controls
significantly more legislative power and resources than the other.
49
In this paper, horizontal power distribution describes the situation where P2 and P3 control similar
legislative power and resources.
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As shown in Table 1, in a strong rule of law environment, the
professional norms are strong; the judiciary is powerful and independent. P4
has an incentive to enforce the law, and it matters little how power is
distributed between the litigants.
In a weak rule of law environment, however, P4’s decision depends
on the power distribution between the litigants. If P2 and P3 are both
powerful actors, the court50 can have a say even if its institutional power is
weak. In this horizontal power distribution, the court can function as a
tiebreaker between P2 and P3. But if the power distribution between P2 and
P3 is vertical, that is, one player is significantly more powerful than the
other, then the court’s decision turns on which party the law favors. If the
law favors the more powerful, the court will not hesitate to enforce it. But if
the law favors the less powerful, then the court is in a feeble position to
enforce it.
At the compliance stage, P2 and P3 make a choice between
compliance and noncompliance. Their decision at this stage turns on the
outcome at the enforcement level. As we have seen, in a strong rule of law
context, the law is to be enforced. So P2 and P3’s decisions turn on the
difference between the cost of compliance and the cost of noncompliance.
In a weak rule of law context, we get a similar outcome if P2 and P3 enjoy
relatively equal political power. If, however, P2 has more institutional
power than P3, and if the law favors P3, then both P2 and P3 know that P4
will not enforce the law due to the substantial costs. With this expectation in
mind, P2 will choose noncompliance. It is trivial that P3 will choose
compliance, or at the least be indifferent between the two choices, since the
law favors him.51
Going one step backward to the legislation stage, P2 and P3 make a
choice between resisting and not resisting. Again, their decisions depend on
the outcomes at the subsequent stages. In a strong rule of law context, the
reasonable expectation is that the law will be enforced, and compliance
probably is the better choice for P2 and P3. In that case, their decision at the
legislation level turns on the probability of successfully blocking the draft or
interpretation, and the cost of compliance. In other words, P2 or P3 will
choose to resist if and only if:

50

P1 is often legal scholars, officials in Beijing, or judges of the highest court; here the court refers
to the local or regional adjudicative body.
51
I assume that the cost associated with compliance is lower than that associated with
noncompliance if the law favors the party.
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(probability of successful blocking) * (cost of compliance)
≥ (cost of blocking)
The lower the cost of blocking, the higher the probability of successful
blocking, and the higher the cost of compliance, the more likely the
condition is satisfied, and the more likely P2 or P3 will choose to resist.
The same applies to the situation where there is weak rule of law, but
horizontal power distribution between P2 and P3. If one of the players
successfully blocks the draft or interpretation, then the model reverts to
status quo. Since P2 and P3 take adversarial positions under the proposed
law, there is no prisoners’ dilemma problem for resisting the draft or an
interpretation.52
In a weak rule of law context, if the law favoring the weaker player is
not expected to be enforced against the more powerful one, the latter has no
incentive to resist at the legislative stage.
Going back to the first stage, drafting and interpreting, P1 makes a
choice among maintaining status quo, making a more sophisticated draft or
interpretation favoring P1, or making a more sophisticated draft or
interpretation favoring P2. Holding other factors constant, P1 wants to
change the status quo and make a law that brings the judiciary more prestige
and power. If the draft or interpretation is successfully blocked, however,
P1 suffers the waste of time and resources. If the draft or interpretation goes
through the legislative stage, P1 gets the credit for it.53 Therefore, P1’s
decision turns on the probability of P2 and P3’s choosing to resist. If P1
expects the draft or interpretation to be successfully blocked by one player,
then he is better off either choosing status quo, or making the law favoring
this player, based on the context. Ultimately, P1’s decision turns on the
outcomes in all the subsequent stages and the payoffs determined by the
context of the game.
Below are two game trees that illustrate the scenarios that will be
discussed in the empirical evidence section.
52
For an introduction of prisoner’s dilemma, see Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner & Randal Picker,
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994). Generally, the dilemma describes a situation in which two prisoners
are charged with a crime for which the prosecutor lacks sufficient evidence to convict. Given the model’s
conditions, the game theory result of the dilemma is such that the best choice for either of the prisoners is to
confess, no matter what the other one does, though collectively, it is better for both to choose not to
confess.
53
In the model, I simplify the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature. I use the verb
“block” to represent a wide range of legislative acts that have the effect of nullifying or modifying the
effect of a legal interpretation. Such acts may take the form of modifying extent statutes or amending the
constitution. The form depends on the political structure. In China, for instance, the People’s Congress can
intervene and veto a Supreme Court interpretation.
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Variables:
F2:
F3:
SQ:
R:
NR:

Draft or Interpretation Favoring P2
Draft or Interpretation Favoring P3
Status Quo
Resist
Not Resist

C:
NC:
E:
NE:

Compliance
Noncompliance
Enforce
Not Enforce

P2:
P4:

b
d

Payoffs:
P1:
P3:

1.

a
c

Scenario I
(1) Weak Rule of Law Context;
(2) Vertical Power Distribution with P2 Being More Powerful;
(3) P1’s Preference: F3>F2>S.Q.
Plus the following conditions of payoffs:
a11>Max (a1, a2, a4, a5, a6, a7);
b11>Max ( b3, b8, b9);
d11>d10.

Game Tree 1.
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Scenario II
(1) weak rule of law context & horizontal power distribution; or, strong rule of
law context;
(2) (probability of successful blocking) * (cost of compliance) ≥ (cost of
blocking) satisfied;
(3) Player 1’s preference: F2< >F3>S.Q.
plus the following conditions of payoffs:
a1>Max (a2, a3);
b3>b8>b10;
c2>c4>c6;
d4>d5; d6>d7; d8>d9; d10>d11.

Game Tree 2.

V.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE INTERACTIVE THEORY

This section presents five empirical comparisons of different laws,
countries, and regimes that support the interactive theory discussed in the
last section. First, while holding the subject of law constant, an analysis is
made of how the variation in power distribution and legal authority affects
the substance of the law. The reason that China seems to have more
restrictive laws against police nonfeasance is that local officials did not
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expect the law restraining the government to be enforced. Second, the
differences between the making of comprehensive bankruptcy and
administrative laws in China support the contention that the written law is a
variable of its expected enforcement, which is further determined by the
power distribution between potential parties. Third, a comparison of the
making of insolvency law in China and in Vietnam shows that unlike China,
Vietnam established a set of comprehensive bankruptcy codes in a short time
because the codes were less likely to be enforced in Vietnam. Fourth, the
politics behind the police liability law in the United States illustrate how
power distribution in a rule of law context determines the way the United
States Supreme Court interprets the American Constitution. Last, the
changes in the governmental liability law in South Korea after the country
experienced political transformation show that the legal code may favor the
more powerful when the rule of law is more consolidated.
A.

The Supreme People’s Court of China Favored Broad Interpretation
of Governmental Liability Law

In this subsection, I discuss the preference of the Supreme People’s
Court of China for a broad interpretation of governmental liability law. I use
this empirical case to show that, as my model predicts, the distribution of
political power of potential litigants implicated by a legal change, plus the
weak rule of law environment, explains why citizens in China are ostensibly
better protected by the law against official nonfeasance than their American
counterparts.
In this empirical case, Player 1 is the Supreme People’s Court.
Scholars generally agree that judges tend to maximize the institutional
power of the judiciary when possible. As a group, judges share certain
interests, which include promoting judicial independence, influence, and
authority.54 Most scholars believe or assume that courts want to protect their
legal autonomy from political bodies.55 This is true even in an authoritarian
regime such as China, where judges of the Supreme People’s Court make
efforts to promote the rule of law, though the efforts are constrained.
The leaders of the Court have received legal education at prestigious
law schools in China and abroad. The current president of the Court, Xiao
Yang, graduated from one of the best law schools and was once head of the

54
Karen Alter, Who Are the ‘Masters of the Treaty’?: European Governments and the European
Court of Justice, 52 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 121, 129-130 (1998).
55
Tom Ginsburg, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 75 (2003).
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Ministry of Justice.56 During his term, the ministry initiated a nationwide
legal-aid system in China. A 1998 report said that “lawyers engaging in
legal aid work had handled 70,677 cases, and responded to more than
431,000 requests for legal information in 1997.”57 Xiao and other officials
held the view that establishing a legal aid system was a prerequisite to China
developing a mature legal system.58 In 1999, the Supreme People’s Court
published the “Outline of Five-Year Reform” that aimed at promoting the
power of judiciary by taking concrete measures such as “implementing
public trials,” “enhancing the independence of judicial panels,” and
“publishing court judgments.”59
In China, legal specialists are usually responsible for drafting new
laws. Like their peers sitting in the Supreme Court, these specialists
normally favor a stronger and more independent judiciary. Wang comments
that “Chinese legal academics are increasingly vocal in their calls for
changes to China’s legal system . . . .”60 A community of legal specialists
has emerged, as their number keeps growing.
The community’s
“particularized expertise supports powerful dynamics of group identity,
poses significant challenges for the regime’s control over the content and
direction of legal reform.”61
Player 2 refers to government officials whose behavior falls under the
jurisdiction of the drafted or interpreted law. They can resist the law at the
People’s Congress, or do it at the local level when it is applied. Although
the legislature in an authoritarian regime tends to be regarded as a rubberstamp institution, it functions well as a bargaining forum among different
power groups within the regime. If compromise cannot be reached, a
proposal made by one group may very well be struck down by another.
Player 3 refers to citizens who may be victims in police nonfeasance cases.
Since China is essentially an authoritarian state, citizens are only weakly
represented in the national legislature. Finally, Player 4 refers to judges of
local and regional courts. They choose between applying the law and not
applying it according to the interpretation or the guidelines of the Supreme
People’s Court.
56
See official resume of Xiao Yang, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/200203/01/content_295423.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
57
Benjamin Liebman, Legal Aid and Public Interest Law in China, 34 Tex. Int’l L. J. 211, 212 n.5
(1999).
58
Id. at 222-23.
59
Liming Wang, The Achievements and Prospects of Court Reforms in China, 1 FRONT. LAW CHINA
3-4 (2006).
60
Liebman, supra note 29.
61
Pitman B. Potter, Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and Selective Adaptation, 29 LAW
& SOCIAL INQUIRY, 465, 482 (2004).
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For the reasons given below, officials are better off complying with
the interpretation at the higher level and resisting the law at the local level.
And local judges, due to the weak rule of law environment and the power
distribution, choose not to apply the law.
Institutionally, local courts are dependent on local governments. The
chief judge of a local court is appointed by a small group of leaders of the
local government, which also controls a huge proportion of the expenses of
the courts, including judges’ salaries.62 The quality of local courts is
generally low.63 The majority of local judges do not have a college
education or any formal training in law:64
A 1998 study of nine basic-level courts (the lowest level) in a
major provincial city revealed that only three percent of the
judges had a bachelor’s degree in law. The “great majority”
had held other types of jobs in the court administration such as
bailiff, clerk, or driver before being promoted to the rank of
judge.65
As a consequence, local judges in China do not share strong professional
values or norms. In other words, they do not assign a high value to the duty
of protecting the politically less advantaged, or following the order of the
higher court. Moreover, the media is fully controlled by the state. For fear
of revenge, the local press rarely reports negatively about local officials.66
In short, heavy institutional reliance, in addition to the lack of
professionalism and media monitoring, naturally lead to the lack of judicial
authority of local courts. The following empirical evidence illustrates the
severity of local judicial reliance. Beginning in 2002, an intermediate court
in Zhejiang Province experimented with transferring jurisdiction in
administrative cases. With the approval of the intermediate court, a case
filed in town A will be adjudicated by the local court in town B, with town A
and B in the same jurisdiction of the intermediate court. In the year before
the experiment, government officials lost only 13% of all lawsuits. When
administrative cases were transferred to a different jurisdiction, the

62

Donald Clarke, China’s Legal System and the WTO, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 97, 107

(2003).
63
William P. Alford, Tasseled Loafers for Barefoot Lawyers: Transformation and Tension in the
World of Chinese Legal Workers, THE CHINA QUARTERLY, Mar. 1995, at 22, 36-37.
64
Id. at 31.
65
Clarke, supra note 62, at 108.
66
See Benjamin Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2005).
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percentage jumped to 64.4%. Yet the characteristics of the cases did not
change significantly.67
In a dispute with government officials, P3 citizens are disadvantaged
by their weak political status. In China, local officials are normally
appointed by higher-level CCP secretaries. Due to the absence of a
meaningful electoral process, these officials are not held accountable to local
residents. Therefore, the power relationship between the victims in official
malfeasance or nonfeasance cases and the responsible government agencies,
is often vertical. This imbalance of power is mirrored in the courts. Besides
the institutional reliance of local courts and the subsequent biases against
citizens, victims in administrative cases are also disadvantaged in terms of
the legal resources available to them. Though the Ministry of Justice has set
up a nationwide legal aid system, which was intended to be composed of
quasi-independent organizations, the program has “concentrated in
economically developed urban areas.”68 In addition, local officials can use
various means to keep citizens from learning about the laws and regulations
that they deem threatening.69 Although some argue that the growth of media
in China ameliorates the problem of information control, it is also
recognized that once an issue is considered by the party as damaging to its
legitimacy, the media will remain quiet.70
In administrative cases not related to police inaction, local
governments have additional ways to bypass the law. The Communist Party
and party officials in China are not subject to administrative litigation, even
though the party always has the final say in major policies, local or
national.71 This party immunity sometimes allows local authorities “to
deflect lawsuits.”72 Abstract administrative acts are not reviewable either.
As a result, local judges “can only [maneuver] around a handful of so-called
‘concrete administrative acts,’ and dare not undertake big moves on the
numerous general actions based on ‘policies.’”73
In sum, given all these institutional features, the costs of
noncompliance with the law are very low for local government officials.
Meanwhile, the expected low level of compliance, the high level of
67

Duan Hongqing, Deng dai zui gao fa yuan chai qian si fa jie shi, Caijing, June 7, 2004, available
at http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20040607/1238799895.shtml (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
68
Benjamin Liebman, Legal Aid and Public Interest Law in China, 34 Tex. Int’l L. J. 211, 214
(1999).
69
Liebman, supra note 29.
70
See Liebman, supra note 66, at 122-23.
71
O’Brien & Li, supra note 19, at 80.
72
Id.
73
Id.
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institutional reliance, rampant corruption, and the low level of
professionalism all counsel local courts not to enforce the law when local
officials are the defendants. Certain features of the judicial system afford
local courts “the choice of accepting or declining a case. This power is
somewhat akin to the institution of summary judgment in its gate-keeping
function, but quite unlike it in that it is not governed by any consistent set of
principles.”74 Local judges often decline to adjudicate a case if substantial
interests of local government are at stake. Even if the court accepts a case, it
is very difficult for the plaintiff to win without resorting to non-legal
means.75 Consequently, the law is widely regarded as a “frail weapon” that
has not been very effective.76 In short, the best choices at the local level are
for P2 government officials not to comply with the law, and for P4 local
judges not to enforce the law. In addition, the low costs at this level reduce
the incentive for P2 to resist the drafting or interpreting of the law at the
central level. Since the law is aimed at restraining government officials, P3
citizen representatives at the National People’s Congress are not motivated
to block it. Expecting weak resistance, P1, the Supreme People’s Court,
pushed the envelope by signaling its preference for the legal interpretation
that favors victims of official nonfeasance. To the Court this is a better
choice because justices are motivated to maximize judicial authority and get
credit for establishing legal restraints on the authoritarian state77 (see Game
Tree 1).
The evidence thus far appears to endorse the argument that laws do
not matter in China, and therefore are easy to make. This argument oversimplifies the issue, however. Laws matter as a label of legitimacy,
especially when they are used by the politically powerful to further their
interests, or when they regulate the relationship between parties of similar
political status.78 When there is horizontal power distribution between the
litigants, i.e., Player 2 and Player 3 have similar institutional capacity, even a
weak court can function as a tiebreaker by enforcing the law. As illustrated
earlier, in such a context, Players 2 and 3 make their calculations the same
way as if in a strong rule of law environment. The high cost of compliance
74

Clarke, supra note 62, at 109.
See Bing Gan, Guangxi gao yuan wei he zan bu shou li 13 lei an jian, Ren min wang, Aug. 24,
2004, available at http://unn.people.com.cn/GB/14748/2733920.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2007)
(Provincial high courts in China normally have internal rules regarding the general types of cases lower
courts should not accept. One such rule was revealed by the media in 2004. It contained thirteen types of
cases, most of which involve the substantial interests of local governments).
76
O’Brien & Li, supra note 19, at 76.
77
See infra, Game Tree 1.
78
See infra, Table 1.
75
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will motivate the player whom the law disfavors to choose to resist at the
legislative stage.79 For this reason, some laws, in contrast to the
administrative laws, have only passed the Chinese legislature after more than
ten years of drafting and redrafting. This is the case with the making of a
new bankruptcy law in China.
B.

The Making of a New Bankruptcy Law in China Shows the
Shortcomings of the Over-Simplified Theory that Laws in China Do
Not Matter

The making of a new bankruptcy law in China shows the
shortcomings of the over-simplified theory that legal change in China
progresses at a rapid rate because the laws are not applied. Like the
administrative law discussed in Section I, the new bankruptcy law will be
applied in a weak rule of law environment. My model posits that the
drafting process took more than ten years because of the horizontal power
distribution of the potential litigants.
When a law is proposed and drafted, if the power distribution between
Player 2 and Player 3 is relatively horizontal, the model predicts the law will
be applied at a higher level. If the cost of compliance is high, the player
whom the law disfavors will strongly resist the draft at the legislative stage.
As a consequence, the draft will not pass as easily as any of the
administrative laws.
From 1949 to 1986, no bankruptcy law existed because of the planned
economy. In 1986, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise
Bankruptcy (Trial Implementation) was passed by the legislature for the
purpose of increasing efficiency of state-owned companies, and only applied
to state-owned enterprises.80 Five years later, the People’s Congress
approved the PRC Civil Procedure Law, “with Chapter XIX applying to the
bankruptcy of [non-state-owned] enterprises with legal person status.”81 A
few other Chinese laws also contain clauses that touch on the issue of
bankruptcy. Chapter VIII of the PRC Company Law stipulates liquidation

79

In the game theoretical setup, at the Legislation Stage, the player whom the law disfavors will
resist the law if and only if: (probability of successful blocking) * (cost of compliance) ≥ (cost of blocking).
80
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo qi ye po chan fa (shi xing) [Enterprise Bankruptcy (Trial
Implementation)] art. 2, Ch. 1 (1986) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.scsdaj.gov.cn/dac/pdfbak/
zxl45l19861202.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
81
Charles Booth, Drafting Bankruptcy Laws in Socialist Market Economies: Recent Developments
in China and Vietnam, 18 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 93, 94 (2004).
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procedures.82 Article 71 of the PRC Commercial Bank Law provides that a
commercial bank can be declared bankrupt if permission of the Banking
Regulatory Commission is granted.83 The laws that compose China’s
insolvency regime are “short and incomplete.”84 Thus, “it should not be
surprising that there are many inconsistencies as well as gaps and omissions”
in these laws.85 This problem is further exacerbated by the fast-growing
economy, which changes significantly the forms of business organization
and the performance of state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”). The Supreme
People’s Court has needed to issue numerous interpretations to meet the
demand of a fast growing market economy.86
In response to the inadequacy of the trial bankruptcy law, the Chinese
government began a review of the Bankruptcy Law as early as in 1994, and
a comprehensive draft was completed in 1995. The national legislature did
not pass it at that time. Since then, a number of drafts have been written and
circulated for comments. Some drafters complained of the delay in the
legislature after eight years of drafting.87 There was much speculation that
the law would have passed in 2004,88 but it was not until August 27, 2006
that the Chinese People’s Congress enacted the new Corporate Bankruptcy
Law.89 Why was this process so different from the making of administrative
law discussed earlier? The interactive theory best explains the dramatic
difference.
Holding other variables constant, the preferences of Players 1, 2 and 3
are the following: P1 prefers a more sophisticated bankruptcy law than
status quo. P2 hopes to see a law promoting his interests. If this is not
available, then status quo is preferred over a law favoring P3. For P3, the
preference ranking is: a law favoring P3 > status quo > a law favoring P2.
The institutional context for bankruptcy cases is the same as that for
administrative ones. The major difference is that Player 3 is not a powerless
82
See id. at 98. See also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo gong si fa [Company Law], Ch. X (2005)
(P.R.C.), available at http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2005-10/28/content_85478.htm (last visited Feb. 18,
2007).
83
See Booth, supra note 81, at 99. See also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo gong shang ye yin hang
fa [Commercial Bank Law] art. 71, Ch. 7 (passed 1995, amended 2003) (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jingji/1040/2267854.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
84
Booth, supra note 81, at 99.
85
Id.
86
Li Shuguang, Bankruptcy Law in China: Lessons of the Past Twelve Years, 5 HARVARD ASIA
QUARTERLY (2001), available at http://www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view/95/40/.
87
Yang Ye, “No Bankruptcy After Eight Years, Drafter Complains,” Economic Monthly, June,
2002.
88
“New Bankruptcy Law Is Coming,” China Economic Weekly, Vol. 42, 24 (2004).
89
China Enacts New Bankruptcy Law, BBC NEWS, August 28, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/business/5291910.stm.
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citizen, but institutional creditors, mainly state-owned banks. Player 2
represents business enterprises and their workers’ unions, both backed by
local governments. In the making of a new bankruptcy law, unlike
administrative laws, any deviation from the status quo may benefit one
player at the expense of the other. Therefore, both Player 2 and Player 3
may have incentives to resist the law when it is drafted. Also, in China, the
group of creditors is led by state-owned banks that are politically powerful
in the legislature. They have the institutional strength to put up significant
resistance to the drafting and passage of a law that is perceived to be against
their interests. In addition, the small number of national banks reduces the
costs of collective action and makes the resistance at the higher level more
consistent and powerful.90 In other words, both the probability of successful
blocking and the cost of compliance are high. Therefore, it is more likely
for the banking sector to choose “Resist” at the legislative stage when the
draft law is perceived to be against their interest and the enforcement level is
high.
Unlike in the United States, there are no specific bankruptcy courts in
China. Judges dealing with such issues are members of the local courts (P4).
They are not necessarily any more professional, independent, or corruptionproof than their peers presiding over administrative cases.
In an administrative case, the defendant is normally a government
official. Plaintiffs, either unorganized citizens or companies, are in a
politically disadvantaged position under the authoritarian political system,
both at the local level and in the legislature. For the reasons discussed
above, the administrative laws, when used by this politically weak group, do
not pose serious challenges to the local government. As a result, the laws
largely remain unused. In contrast, a new bankruptcy law is expected to
regulate parties of relatively similar political powers.
A bankruptcy case usually involves a company and a group of
creditors. In China, the former almost always has the support of the local
government and the latter are often led by state-owned banks. The close
symbiosis of local government and local business in China has been well
documented.91 A widely held view on the dramatic economic development
in China is that local governments
90
For basic ideas of the collective action problem, see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
91
See, e.g., Andrew G. Walder, Local Governments as Industrial Firms: An Organizational Analysis
of China’s Transitional Economy, 101 AM. J. SOC. 263 (1995); Jean C. Oi, Fiscal Reform and the
Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China, 45 WORLD POL. 99 (1992); Jiahua Che &
Yingyi Qian, Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms, 113 Q. J. ECON., 467 (1998).
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treat enterprises within their administrative purview as one
component of a larger corporate whole. Local officials act as
the equivalent of a board of directors and sometimes more
directly as the chief executive officers. At the helm of this
corporate-like organization is the Communist Party secretary.92
Due to this symbiosis,
if investments are made wisely, local governments can meet
expenses, keep a portion of the extra tax revenues (at the
townships and county levels) and enjoy larger amounts of extrabudgetary non-tax revenues . . . . [T]hat has made township and
village enterprises such a lucrative source of income for local
governments and why they are so enthusiastically promoted.93
In other words, the incomes of the officials at these levels are “directly
affected by the performance and growth of their rural enterprises.”94
As discussed earlier, local courts have strong incentives to cooperate
with local governments to further their interests. Expecting green lights
from the judges, local governments often coordinate with bankrupt
enterprises to over-compensate workers with the assets of the entity so that
the laid-off employees will not be a financial burden.95 Since employee
settlement often left little money from the creditors, “state-owned banks,
which are the main creditors of SOEs, are often hit hard by SOE
bankruptcies.”96 Also, fraudulent bankruptcy, in which local governments
help local enterprises evade debts with the protection of local courts, is
widespread.97 In these cases, the assets of bankrupt enterprises normally
turn into properties of local government or corrupt government officials. As
Li notes, “legal mechanisms to guarantee creditor's interests are weak at
best.”98
The latest draft of the new bankruptcy law was intended to be
uniformly applicable in par with the international standards. Agreement
could not be reached on several key issues including the priority of the
interest of secured creditors vis a vis workers’ compensation, and the
92

Jean C. Oi, The Role of Local State in China’s Transitional Economy, 144 CHINA Q. 1132, 1132
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appointment of bankruptcy administrators, who will be granted substantial
power and discretion in managing bankruptcy under the new law. Stateowned banks want the administrators appointed by a creditor’s committee,
and other groups want them appointed by the local courts. This is a strategic
decision made by the banks to mitigate the influence of the local interests
and the power of local courts. The concern of the creditors is that if the draft
favoring more judicial discretion in bankruptcy cases were passed, the
current collusions between local courts and local government would have
additional legitimacy and would be more difficult to detect. With the
bankruptcy administrator appointed by the creditor’s committee, the power
distribution at the local level will be more horizontal, and the enforcement of
the law will be more neutral. The appointment issue is the most contentious
one, and it has not yet been fully resolved.99
In contrast to the governmental liability law, local governments
cannot afford to ignore a draft insolvency law that is preferred by the
banking sector and let it pass the legislature. This is due to the relatively
strong political power of the national banks. Although local governments
have the support of local courts, state-owned banks are powerful political
institutions. Armed with a more favorable bankruptcy law, they can mount a
meaningful challenge to local officials. As discussed earlier, one means is
appointing a bankruptcy administrator from cities or provinces that are not
under the influence of the local government. The banks could also use the
law to impose pressure on higher-ranking regional and provincial judges or
officials. In short, the distribution of political power on the two sides of the
game is more balanced than the one in the administrative law context. Each
party considers favorable legal code important. As a result, each party
strongly resisted the passage of a drafted law that was perceived to be
against their interests. Therefore, it took more than ten years for a new
bankruptcy law to materialize in China.100
Although the content of a draft law matters in that more sophisticated
provisions tend to be better applied, since rights and obligations are clarified
in more situations, the comparison between the drafting and interpretation of
the insolvency law and the law on governmental liability in China shows
that in a setting of a weak rule of law, the power distribution among
potential parties to a case matters as much as the law itself. If the law is to
be used by the politically weak against the strong, the probability of its realworld enforcement is low. If the law is to coordinate the relationship
99
100
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between parties of similar political status, or be in favor of the politically
strong, the probability of its enforcement is high. If that is the case, the
party that will be disadvantaged by the law will have strong incentives to
resist the law at an earlier stage, i.e. the legislative level, preventing it from
being put into effect.
C.

The Making of Bankruptcy Law in Vietnam Supports the Interactive
Theory

This subsection discusses the recent process of making a
comprehensive insolvency law in Vietnam, which has an institutional setup
almost identical to China. The major difference between the two countries,
which led to the swift legislation of a bankruptcy law in Vietnam, is that in
Vietnam the bankruptcy law was not expected to be applied because the
potential litigants have not developed distinguished group interests. As I
will show, this empirical case supports the argument that legal environment
and the distribution of political power explain how laws are drafted,
interpreted, and legislated.
Vietnam and China resemble each other in many aspects relevant to
this analysis. Both countries are ruled by communist parties, whose
legitimacy depends largely on developing the national economy. Both
countries are embedded in the Asian culture, in particular Confucianism.
Both experienced foreign invasions and national liberation through military
struggles in recent history. The institutional setups of the two countries are
the same. All political powers, according to their constitutions, belong to a
people’s legislature,101 which is dominated by the communist party of each
country.102 Both are carrying out export-oriented economic reforms, and the
Vietnamese government copied many of the reform policies made by its
Chinese counterpart.103 The major difference is that Vietnam started its
bankruptcy reforms about a decade later than China,104 and the payoffs for
each party in the game are different in Vietnam.

101
VIETNAM CONST. art. 4, (1992), translated at http://www.isop.ucla.edu/eas/documents/VNcons.htm#Chapter%20VI:%20The%20National%20As%20sembly (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). Article 4
discusses the role of Communist Party in the State and society.
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VIETNAM CONST. art. 4.
103
Ronald J. Cima, Vietnam’s Economic Reform: Approaching the 1990s, 29 ASIA SURV. 786, 793-94
(1989).
104
See Brian Van Arkadie & Do Duc Dinh, Economic Reform in Tanzania and Vietnam: A
Comparative Commentary, §1.0 (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 706, 2004) (on file with
Journal); Sonoko Nishitateno, China’s Special Economic Zones: Experimental Units for Economic Reform,
32 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 175, 175 (1983).
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In Vietnam, as in China, some established legal professionals are
dedicated to the promotion of judicial power.105 However, authoritarian rule
is more heavy-handed in Vietnam.106 Although private business is
blossoming, the government has more control of the national economy than
its counterpart in China. Corruption is also more rampant, and the judiciary
is virtually a tool of the party.107 A World Bank study shows high levels of
corruption in China, with more severe problems in Vietnam.108 In Vietnam,
court management and judge selection fall under the authority of Ministry of
Justice.109 Given all these factors, it is little surprise that the World Bank
concludes that the rule of law is even weaker in Vietnam than in China.110
The differences in these factors, i.e. more state control of the
economy, lower level of legal professionalism, less judicial independence,
and more corrupt officials, determine that payoffs for P2 and P3 in Vietnam
are not the same as in China. And as my model predicts, Vietnam has a
more developed and unified bankruptcy law than does China.
Vietnam began drafting a bankruptcy law in 1992 “with the goal of
creating a ‘uniform, complete legal system.’”111 It took less than two years

105
Mark Sidel, The Re-Emergence of Legal Discourse in Vietnam, 43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 163, 170171 (1994).
106
According to annual reports by Freedom House on trends in political and civil liberty, Vietnamese
citizens enjoyed less civil liberty than the Chinese in 1999-2000. The gap disappeared in 2000. From 2000
to 2004, the civil liberty scores for the two countries remained the same. Vietnamese citizens enjoyed more
civil liberty than the Chinese in 2005. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (1972-2006), available
at http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAllScores.xls.
107
See Penelope (Pip) Nicholson & Nguyen Hung Quang, The Vietnamese Judiciary: The Politics of
Appointment and Promotion, 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1, 10 (2005).
108
Data generated from World Bank Data on Governance, available at http://www.worldbank.org/
wbi/governance/data (follow “Interactive Web Access to Worldwide Governance Research Indicators
Dataset” hyperlink; then follow “4. Download data in excel format”, then choose China and Vietnam) (last
visited Nov. 27, 2006).
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for the law to be enacted and implemented.112 The law applied uniformly to
both SOEs and non-SOEs. Booth believes that the Vietnamese law is “more
expansive than the Chinese approach in that it applied to both legal person
and non-legal person enterprises.”113
However, this seemingly
comprehensive law was almost never utilized.114
Booth suggests four reasons for the dormancy of the law,115 and they
all point to the tight control of SOEs by the state, lack of judicial autonomy,
and the lack of awareness of the Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law. When the
state directly manages the majority of the SOEs, courts are bypassed in
insolvency issues. Judges in Vietnam “played the ‘central and decisive’ role
in bankruptcy proceedings—from appointing the members of the trustee
committee to chairing the creditors' meeting,”116 but only seventy such cases
were recorded from 1994 to 2002.117 Most of the insolvent SOEs either
received subsidies or were dissolved directly by the state. As a result, local
governments and local courts were not involved. In other words, the state
protected the interests of creditors from predation by local officials.
Meanwhile, given the ineffective court system, most of the private firms did
not bother going through the legal process.118 Viewed through the
theoretical framework of the paper, we see how low usage of a law led to its
swift drafting and legislation.
To improve upon the 1993 law, the Vietnamese government drafted a
new bankruptcy law in 2002. After much progress was made, the Vietnam
Law on Bankruptcy was enacted in 2004.119 Booth compares five areas of
the draft insolvency law in China, which finally passed the legislature on
August 27, 2006, and the new bankruptcy law in Vietnam. Apart from some
minor differences, both laws impress him as modern and comprehensive,
much better than their previous versions. Not surprisingly, Booth sees more
checks and balances built into the Chinese law, while the Vietnamese Law
does not reflect such a compromise.120
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The comparison between the making of Vietnamese bankruptcy law
and the Chinese bankruptcy law strongly support the argument that in a
weak rule of law environment, laws are easy to make if they are not
expected to be applied. This link between law making and law enforcement
does not exist if the distribution of power between potential litigants is
horizontal, as is the case with the Chinese bankruptcy law.
D.

The Politics of the United States Supreme Court Opinions on Official
Nonfeasance Support the Interactive Theory

The United States provides an application of the interactive theory in
a strong rule of law context, where potential litigants of a contemplated legal
change are more likely to resist legislation if they expect the change to have
a negative impact when applied. Taking the resistance into consideration,
those in the position to make the change will take great precaution to prevent
legislation unfavorable to their position. As a result, laws on the books in
strong rule of law countries may not look as favorable to state citizens as
laws in countries with a weak legal environment.
Compared to China and Vietnam, the payoffs for each party in a
strong rule of law country such as the United States are different in many
ways. First, better rule of law means stronger legal professionalism and
more judicial independence. The cost-benefit analysis for judges, P1 and
P4, is different. American judges, more than their counterparts in China,
adhere to the principles of following the law and doing justice. This is not to
suggest that American judges are better individuals with higher levels of
morality; they are simply embedded in a different institutional environment.
Also, because of free media and better monitoring system, corruption is not
as rampant in the United States as in China.
Empirical evidence shows that while state courts sometimes deviate
from Supreme Court decisions,121 lower federal courts are largely consistent
in applying federal law.122 P2s are also better-trained officials compared to
those in China, and are subject to monitoring by free mass media, judicial
review, and in some situations, a democratic electoral mechanism. Research
has found that to federal bureaucrats, obeying the law is almost always
121
See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States Supreme Court Regulatory
Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. LAW J.
523, 537 (1995) (analyzing the frequency of state court application of three prominent U.S. Supreme Court
takings cases).
122
See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 96 (1986)
(analysis of seventeen federal court appellate decisions upholding deferential standard of review to
legislative public use determinations as established in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).
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considered the most desirable thing to do given the costs and benefits shaped
by the institutions:
Federal government agencies complied with 93.2 percent of the
Supreme Court’s opinions and narrowly complied with 6.8
percent of opinions. Also, bureaucracies never defied nor
evaded any of the Court’s decisions, meaning that agencies
never failed to incorporate at least some aspect of the Court’s
legal rules into their implementations. The agency responses
that manifested narrow compliance did not flout the Court’s
authority but they interpreted its opinions in self-interested
ways. . . . When the Court writes legal rules adverse to agency
interests, government bureaucracies usually faithfully interpret
and implement them.123
Recent research also hypothesizes that government officials anticipate lower
court decisions and change their actions accordingly.124
Moreover, once the law is made, individuals are more likely to use it
to protect their interests. Unlike in China, where victims of official
nonfeasance are seriously disadvantaged both inside and outside the
courtroom, the American legal system affords ordinary citizens relatively
equal standing against government officials in front of a judge, both at the
federal and the state level. In the last few decades, there has also been a
dramatic movement towards greater legal consciousness and the assertion of
legal rights.125 As a result, a new Supreme Court decision will trigger more
cases to be brought in lower courts against federal or state officials.
In addition, studies demonstrate that government officials make costbenefit analyses.126 Government agencies’ compliance with the Court
depends on the characteristics of the implementation environment, as such
characteristics affect agencies’ perceptions of the costs and benefits of how
to respond to the Court.127 If the cost of compliance is too high, they are
better off resisting the law through other channels, for example through the
legislature. Scholars observed that if powerful groups are hurt by Supreme

123
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Court decisions, they opt to resist through Congress.128 If the Court expects
strong resistance by officials at a higher level, it must consider the
consequence of the legislature's reaction. After all, the judiciary relies on
other institutions for its rules to be implemented.129
This reliance suggests that if the legislature strongly opposes a ruling,
the legislature can nullify it by changing the Constitution, making a new law
that bypasses or partially reverses the court decision, or changing the
institution of the Court.130 Ignagni and Meernik demonstrate that Congress
is usually successful when confronting the Court.131 Although their
evidence is somehow compromised by the self-selection problem, which
means Congress responds assertively only when its members expect to win
in a battle against the Court, the overall evidence “does indicate that
Congress is ready and capable of striking back at the Court when it deems
necessary.”132 Moreover, if confrontation with Congress is to be avoided, a
rational Court will pay deference to state and local governments when they
opt to protect their interests through the judicial channel.
Scholars have shown that not only did states and localities
appear before the Supreme Court more often, they also won a
higher proportion of their cases . . . . Importantly, they were
victorious in 55% to 70% of all their Supreme Court cases since
1970. The only parties consistently doing better as appellants
during the 36-year period were minorities, unions, and the
federal government. The [state and local government] success
rate as respondent was exceeded only by that of the federal
government.133
In short, in a strong rule of law environment such as the United States, laws
are expected to apply. Studies have shown that the Court faces meaningful
resistance from the legislators if the ruling is against the interest of their
constituencies. To avoid a show-down, a rational Court will pay deference
to state and local governments when possible.
Applying this reasoning to the laws on governmental liability for
police inaction, once the court imposes a positive duty on the police to
128
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protect individuals, the costs and benefits for implicated officials will change
significantly. Law enforcement under such a rule would incur considerably
higher costs. For instance, in New Jersey alone, the courts issued 34,698
and 36,071 temporary restraining orders in 1999 and 2000 respectively.134 If
the Supreme Court in Town of Castle Rock had found the failure to respond
to the restraining order was a violation of procedural due process,
significantly more victims of police nonfeasance would have a colorable
constitutional claim. As a result of the increased threat of lawsuits,
legislators representing the interest of law enforcement officers will resist
through the legislature. Since state governments have substantial interests in
this matter, they would react too. Anticipating strong resistance from state
and local governments either in court or through Congress, the Supreme
Court has declined the invitation to create a federal constitutional right for
individuals to receive police protection.
In sum, because of the stronger rule of law environment in the United
States, the full impact of the Court decision would, inter alia, substantially
increase the costs for government officials, which makes them better off
resisting the decision at the legislative level. Anticipating strong resistance
from other branches and the high costs of confronting them, the Supreme
Court opted not to tie the hands of the officials too tightly. To be more
specific, the expected resistance would be too strong for the Supreme Court
to make police inaction a constitutional violation. As a result, the Court has
never upheld such a claim, either under the guise of substantive due
process,135 or as procedural due process.136 The court notes that state
legislatures are welcome to make such laws.137
While laws against official nonfeasance are almost nonexistent in
America, official malfeasance is subject to judicial punishment. Congress
enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946 to check the tortious acts
committed by the federal government.138 Given the strong rule of law
context, the statute reasonably contains a long list of provisions aimed at
ensuring that federal officials are only liable for clear malfeasance and the
federal government is not overburdened. Limits on the government burden
include that the United States “shall not be liable for interest prior to
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judgment or for punitive damages;”139 sets the attorney fees to less than “25
per centum of any judgment rendered;”140 and confers immunity to officials
when they are exercising or performing a “discretionary function or duty on
the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government.”141 Fully
aware of the potential resistance from federal officials through the
legislature, the Supreme Court has been careful not to strictly interpret this
“discretionary function.” It stipulates that to fall into the exception, a
government act must “involve[ ] an element of judgment or choice” and “be
‘based on considerations of public policy’ or at least ‘susceptible to policy
analysis.’”142 “This test has allowed the discretionary function exception to
swallow much of the liability that the FTCA purports to create.”143 The
same rationale applies to the judicial politics of Section 1983, which “creates
a cause of action for the deprivation of federal rights ‘under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State.’”144 In
coordinating the relationship between the federal government and state
governments, the Court is better positioned to assert more judicial authority.
In Monroe v. Pape, the Court found a cause of action against thirteen police
officers of the City of Chicago who violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights by breaking into their homes and mistreating them.145 The Court held
the city government could not be liable as Section 1983 lacked legislative
intent to include municipalities.146 This ruling triggered waves of litigation
against state and local officials. Quite naturally, the Court in later opinions
“attempted to stem the tide of litigation by developing jurisdictional
limitations on these suits.”147
In sum, the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme People’s
Court of China, embedded in different contexts, took counterintuitive actions
with regard to laws on police nonfeasance. With weak institutional power,
low quality courts at the local level, unclear statutes, and powerful officials,
the Chinese Supreme Court signaled its preference for broadly interpreting
the laws on governmental liability and favored the rule that police officers
139
140
141
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owe a positive duty to protect individual citizens. In contrast, with strong
institutional power, high quality federal courts at the circuit and district
levels, flexible constitutional provisions, and more law abiding government
officials, the United States Supreme Court dismissed the claim that the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution affords any remedy to individual citizens
who are victims of police nonfeasance. This counterintuitive contrast, if
viewed from the game theoretic perspective discussed in Section III, is
perfectly reasonable.
E.

Changes in the Governmental Liability Law in South Korea Support
the Interactive Theory

Recent changes to the governmental liability law in South Korea
show, as predicted by the interactive theory, that a supreme court composed
of a group of highly dedicated legal professionals, combined with vertical
power distribution between potential parties, and weak rule of law can lead
to ostensibly high level of judicial restraint on government officials. The
interactive theory also predicts that once the legal environment improves, the
court will relax the judicial restraint due to its costly application.
Since the ceasefire of the Korean War, South Korea has experienced
one of the most remarkable political and economic transformations in human
history. From a backward colony of Japan, South Korea grew into a
powerful industrial country and joined the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development after only three decades of development.148
Soon after the war, the United States government set up a democratic polity
in the southern peninsula. This government was short-lived. A military
general took over the power and started an authoritarian rule that lasted for
almost thirty years, which was interrupted only by military coups and
assassinations. In the 1990s, however, South Korea went through a
relatively peaceful democratization.149
As the political institution
transformed, so did the power allocation within the system. This
transformation created an ideal test ground for the proposed theory. As
noted earlier, the theory predicts that a group of highly dedicated high court
judges, vertical power distribution of potential litigants, and a weak rule of
law can lead to an ostensibly high level of legal restraint on government
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officials. And when the contextual factors change, so do the ostensible legal
constraints.
In general, Korean judges are more professional than their peers in
China. The selection process is based purely on merit, reflected by passage
of the bar examination. Records show that “from 1949 to 1980, in a thirtyyear period, a total of only 1902 candidates passed the bar examination, an
average of fifty-nine a year, for a population of 30 to 40 million people.”150
This reflects an average passage rate of one to two percent.151 In the last two
decades, the number of legal professionals increased, but the change was
slow.152 Many of the successful candidates graduated from the same elite
law school, and all are trained for two years after the bar exam at the Judicial
Research and Training Institute, which naturally strengthens the appreciation
of a collective goal and solidifies professional norms.153 As a result, judges
are held by the society to higher intellectual and moral standards.154 The
best illustration of the professionalism of high court judges in Korea is their
challenge, or self-sacrifice, to the authority of a military dictator. In 1971,
the Supreme Court tested the limit of its power by holding Article 2 of the
National Compensation Act unconstitutional.155 The decision was later
overruled by a Constitutional Amendment. All the justices who had agreed
on the unconstitutionality of the law in the case were denied a second
term.156 This series of interaction between the Supreme Court of Korea and
the authoritarian state illustrates the professional commitment of the judges,
the institutional weakness of the Court, and the heavy rule of the state before
democratization.
In the last three decades, Korea transformed from a military
dictatorship into a liberal democracy. Throughout this period, as the power
distribution of the actors changed, so did the payoffs of different strategies in
this law-making game. A survey of the governmental liability law in South
Korea reveals evidence that supports the hypothesis presented in this article.
Given the high professional commitment of Korean judges, it was
unexpected that its Supreme Court would go as far as its counterpart in
China by preferring the rule that police officers owe a positive duty to
150
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individuals who ask for protection from third-party tortious acts. During
authoritarian rule, however, the Court imposed high nominal standard on
government officials. Until 1996, the Court had consistently held that
“public official[s] [were] liable for compensation to the injured party even in
cases of minor negligence.”157 Yet this tight rule was loosened after the
legal environment in the country improved qualitatively.158 Suh notes that:
Changes have taken place in respect of the position of the court
regarding the liability of the public official to compensate the
injured party. . . .
[O]n February 15, 1996, the plenary body of the Supreme Court
handed down a judgment to the effect that public officials will
be liable for compensation only in cases of deliberate acts or of
gross negligence.159
In other words, the Supreme Court of Korea moved from more closely
resembling the Supreme People’s Court of China to become more like the
United States Supreme Court after the country democratized. This change is
as predicted by the interactive theory. That is, a supreme court composed of
dedicated legal professionals, vertical power distribution between potential
parties, and weak rule of law can lead to ostensibly high level of judicial
restraint on government officials. Once the legal environment improves,
however, the court will relax the judicial restraint due to its costly
application.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The more laws and orders are made prominent,
The more thieves and robbers there will be.
Tao Te Ching v.57
William Alford, a Harvard law professor specializing in comparative
law, cites these two lines in his article “The More Law, The More . . . ?
Measuring Legal Reform in the People’s Republic of Law.”160 He suggests
that scholars drop the easy assumption that more legal codes lead to a better
rule of law, and subsequently, more economic development. This article
157
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suggests that Alford is partially right. There indeed exists a correlation
between rapid legal reform and the weakness of law enforcement. Laws are
easy to make when they are made to be ignored. A theory based solely on
this simple correlation is incomplete, however, since even in a setting of
weak rule of law, legal codes matter if they regulate the relationship between
parties of similar political status.
In this article, I created a game that incorporated four players, one
who drafts or interprets laws, two parties who are implicated by the legal
change, real or contemplated, and one who enforces the law. By studying
how the four players interact in the conceptual game setup when different
payoffs are assigned, we can resolve more empirical puzzles and predict
how laws change in response to changes in other factors such as the legal
environment or the distribution of power of potential litigants. Empirical
evidence from China, Vietnam, the United States, and South Korea support
the interactive theory. The empirical evidence and the theory indicate that
the real effect of significant changes in law is often limited when the
judiciary is weak and when the power of potential litigants is unevenly
distributed.

